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Abstract
Adversaries leverage social network friend relationships to
collect sensitive data from users and target them with abuse
that includes fake news, cyberbullying, malware, and propa-
ganda. Case in point, 71 out of 80 user study participants had
at least 1 Facebook friend with whom they never interact, ei-
ther in Facebook or in real life, or whom they believe is likely
to abuse their posted photos or status updates, or post offen-
sive, false or malicious content. We introduce AbuSniff, a
system that identifies Facebook friends perceived as strangers
or abusive, and protects the user by unfriending, unfollow-
ing, or restricting the access to information for such friends.
We develop a questionnaire to detect perceived strangers and
friend abuse. We introduce mutual Facebook activity features
and show that they can train supervised learning algorithms
to predict questionnaire responses.
We have evaluated AbuSniff through several user studies with
a total of 263 participants from 25 countries. After answer-
ing the questionnaire, participants agreed to unfollow and re-
strict abusers in 91.6% and 90.9% of the cases respectively,
and sandbox or unfriend non-abusive strangers in 92.45% of
the cases. Without answering the questionnaire, participants
agreed to take the AbuSniff suggested action against friends
predicted to be strangers or abusive, in 78.2% of the cases.
AbuSniff increased the participant self-reported willingness
to reject invitations from strangers and abusers, their aware-
ness of friend abuse implications and their perceived protec-
tion from friend abuse.
Introduction
Social networks provide an ideal platform for abuse, that
includes the collection and misuse of private user informa-
tion (Yang and Srinivasan 2014; Yates 2017; Kontaxis et al.
2011), cyberbullying (Singh et al. 2017; Kwan and Skoric
2013), and the distribution of offensive, misleading, false or
malicious information (Cheng et al. 2017; Al-Shishani 2010;
Weimann 2010; Aro 2016). The propensity of social net-
works towards such abuse has brought intense scrutiny and
criticism from users, media, and politicians (Smith 2008;
Angwin and Grassegger 2017; Shahani 2016; Lee 2017;
Wakefield 2017).
Social networks like Facebook have made progress in
raising user awareness to the dangers of making informa-
tion public and the importance of deciding who can access
it. However, many users still allow their Facebook friends to
access their information, including timeline and news feed.
This, coupled with the fact that people often have signif-
icantly more than 150 Facebook friends1 – the maximum
Copyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
1Participants in our studies had up to 4,880 friends,M=305.
number of meaningful friend relationships that humans can
manage (Dunbar 1992)) – suggests that Facebook users may
still be vulnerable to attacks.
To evaluate user perception of exposure to abusive friend
behaviors, we designed 2 user studies (total n = 80) where
each participant had to evaluate 20 of their randomly se-
lected Facebook friends. 65 of the 80 participants admitted
to have at least 1 friend whom they perceived would abuse
their status updates or pictures, and 60 of the participants had
at least 1 friend whom they perceived would post abusive
material (i.e., offensive, misleading, false or malicious). This
is consistent with recent revelations of substantial abuse per-
petrated through Facebook, including Cambridge Analyt-
ica’s injection of content to change user perception (Ortutay
and Jesdanun 2018), and Facebook’s admission that in the
past two years Russia-based operatives created 80,000 posts
that have reached 126 million users in the US (BBC 2017a;
Lee 2017).
Further, 55 of the 80 participants admitted to have at
least 1 Facebook friend with whom they have never in-
teracted, either online or in person. Such stranger friends
could be bots (Varol et al. 2017) that passively collect sen-
sitive user data and later use it against the user’s best in-
terest, as we also show through pilot study answers. This
corroborates Facebook’s recent estimate that 13% (i.e., 270
million) accounts are either bots or clones (Heath 2017).
Stranger friends can use the collected data to infer other sen-
sitive user information (Yang and Srinivasan 2014), identify
“deep-seated underlying fears, concerns” by companies such
as Cambridge Analytica (Lapowsky 2018), perform pro-
file cloning (Kontaxis et al. 2011), sextorsion (Yates 2017),
identity theft (Nosko, Wood, and Molema 2010), and spear
phishing (Gao et al. 2010) attacks.
These studies signal the need for defenses against abu-
sive and stranger friends, that include restricting the abusers’
access to user information, unfollowing them and even un-
friending - removing them from the friend list. When asked
directly, participants in our studies unfollowed and restricted
access for abusers in 91.6% and 90.9% of the cases, re-
spectively. When informed about the potential privacy risks
posed by stranger friends, participants chose to unfriend or
sandbox (block bi-directional communications with) such
friends in 92.45% of the cases.
Contributions. We develop AbuSniff (Abuse from Social
Network Friends), a system that evaluates, predicts and
protects users against perceived friend abuse in Facebook.
AbuSniff has the potential to mitigate the effects of abuse,
and reduce its propagation through social networks and even
its negative impact on social processes (e.g., electoral). We
introduce the following contributions:
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• Develop a friend abuse questionnaire that captures the
user perception that a Facebook friend (1) is a stranger,
(2) would publish abusive responses to pictures and sta-
tus updates posted by the user, or (3) would publish and
distribute offensive, misleading, false or potentially mali-
cious information. Devise rules to convert identified abuse
into defense actions.
• Propose the hypothesis that data recorded by Facebook
can be used to predict the user perception of friend abuse.
Introduce mutual activity features that quantify the Face-
book recorded interactions between a user and her friend.
Use supervised learning algorithms trained on these fea-
tures to predict (1) user answers to the questionnaire, thus
user perceived strangers and friend abuse and (2) the user
willingness to take defensive actions against such friends.
• Implemented AbuSniff in Android (open source upon
publication), and evaluated it through user studies with
263 participants from 25 countries and 6 continents.
Results. When using data we collected from 1,452 friend re-
lationships (n=57), we found that supervised learning algo-
rithms trained on AbuSniff’s mutual activity features were
able to predict the user answers to the questionnaire ques-
tions, with an F-measure ranging between 69.2% and 89.7%.
Further, AbuSniff was able to predict the cases where the
users chose to ignore the suggested defensive action against
friends, with an F-Measure of 97.3%.
In a user study (n = 40) involving 1,200 Facebook friends,
we found that without having to answer the questionnaire,
participants accepted 78% of AbuSniff’s recommendations
for defensive actions against abusive friends and strangers.
In another study (n = 31) AbuSniff increased participant
self-reported willingness to reject invitations from perceived
strangers and abusers, their awareness of friend abuse impli-
cations and perceived protection from friend abuse.
Background and Model
We briefly summarize the relevant features of Facebook.
Facebook users form friend relationships. Each user has a
friend list of other users with whom she has formed friend
relationships. The timeline (a.k.a wall, or profile) is Face-
book’s central feature, the place where the user can share her
updates, photos, check-ins, and other activities (e.g., post-
ing comments on a status or picture of a friend, confirming
a new friend, etc). These activities appear as stories, in re-
verse chronological order. The timeline also includes friend
activities that directly concern the user, e.g., their comments,
status updates, notes or pictures that reference or include
the user. This sensitive information is accessible by default
by the user’s friends. While users can control with whom
they share each story, i.e., through the audience selector op-
tion, it is well known that they often use the default set-
tings, see e.g., (Madejski, Johnson, and Bellovin 2012). Fur-
ther, a user’s news feed shows stories created by her friends,
groups, and subscribed events. Stories are sorted based on
various features, e.g., post time and type, poster popularity.
Adversary Model
We consider adversaries who leverage the following mecha-
nisms to perpetrate abuse through Facebook:
• Privacy abuse. Collect sensitive information (profiles,
photos, friend lists, locations visited, opinions) posted by
friends on their timelines or take screenshots of stories.
The adversary can then use this data to infer more sensi-
tive information (Yang and Srinivasan 2014), initiate sex-
torsion (Yates 2017), perform profile cloning (Kontaxis
et al. 2011), identity theft (Nosko, Wood, and Molema
2010), and spear phishing (Gao et al. 2010) attacks. Face-
book estimates that 13% (i.e., 270 million) of their ac-
counts are either bots or clones (Heath 2017).
• Timeline abuse. Post abusive replies to stories (e.g., sta-
tus updates, photos) posted by friends on their timeline.
The abusive replies appear on the timeline of the victim,
where the original stories were posted.
• News-feed abuse. The adversary posts abusive material
on his timeline, which is then propagated to the news
feed of his friends. Abusive information includes mate-
rial perceived to be offensive, misleading, false, or ma-
licious. Facebook revealed that Russia-based operatives
created 80,000 posts that have reached 126 million US
users (BBC 2017a; Lee 2017).
Restrictive Actions Against Friends
AbuSniff leverages several defense mechanisms provided
by Facebook to protect the user against strangers and abu-
sive friends: unfollow – stories subsequently posted by the
friend in his timeline no longer appear in the user’s news
feed, restrict – stories published by the user in her timeline
no longer appear in the friend’s news feed, and unfriend –
remove the friend from the user’s list of friends.
Further, we introduce the sandbox defense option, a com-
bination of unfollow and restrict: the user and her friend
no longer receive stories published by the other. Unlike
unfriending, sandboxing will not remove the user and her
friend from each other’s friend lists.
Research Objectives
We study several key questions about friend based abuse:
• (RQ1): Are perceived strangers and friend abuse real
problems in Facebook?
• (RQ2): Are Facebook users willing to take defensive ac-
tions against abusive friends?
• (RQ3): Does AbuSniff have an impact on the willingness
of users to take defensive actions on Facebook friends,
and is this willingness impacted by the type of abuse per-
petrated by the friend and the suggested defensive action?
• (RQ4): Can AbuSniff predict abusive friends and the de-
fenses that users are willing to take against such friends?
• (RQ5): Does AbuSniff impact user awareness of stranger
and abusive friends, and their perception of safety from
such friends?
In order for AbuSniff to be relevant, RQ1, RQ2 and RQ5
need to have positive answers. The answer to RQ3 will im-
pact the design of AbuSniff, while a positive answer to RQ4
will indicate that systems can be built to automatically de-
fend users against friend abuse.
Figure 1: AbuSniff system architecture. The QRM module
delivers the questionnaire. The DCM module collects the
user responses and also Facebook data concerning the re-
lationship with each friend. The APM module uses the col-
lected data to predict the responses to the questionnaire. The
AIE module uses the output of the QRM or APM to identify
abusive friends, and the IM module asks the user to take a
protective action against them.
The AbuSniff System
We have designed the AbuSniff system to help us investigate
these questions. AbuSniff is a mobile app that asks the user
to login to her Facebook account. As illustrated in Figure 1,
AbuSniff consists of modules to collect user responses and
data, predict user responses, identify abusive friends, and
recommend defensive actions. In the following, we describe
each module.
The Questionnaire Module (QRM)
We have designed a questionnaire intended to capture the
user perception of (potentially) abusive behaviors from
friends in Facebook. Since Facebook users tend to have hun-
dreds and even thousands of friends, we decided to present
the questionnaire for each of only a randomly selected sub-
set of the user’s friends. One design goal was that the ques-
tions should help identify the perceived use of the abusive
mechanisms listed in the adversary model. To ensure a sim-
ple navigation of the questionnaire, we further sought to fit
all the questions on a single screen for a variety of popular
smartphones. We have designed the questionnaire through
an iterative process that included a focus group and a pilot
study with 2 K-8 teachers, 1 psychologist, 8 students, 1 den-
tist and 1 homemaker (8 female and 5 male).
Figure 2(a) shows a snapshot of the resulting question-
naire, that consists of 5 questions. The first two questions
(Q1) (How frequently do you interact with this friend in
Facebook) and (Q2) (How frequently do you interact with
this friend in real life) determine the user’s frequency of
interaction with the friend, on Facebook and in real life.
The options are “Frequently”, “Occasionally”, “Not Any-
more” (capturing the case of estranged friends), “Never”
and “Don’t Remember”. We are particularly interested in the
“Never” responses.
After answering “Never” for Q1 for a friend, participants
in the focus group explained that they have never initiated
conversations with the friend and are either not aware of or
interested in communications initiated by the friend, e.g.,
“I never did chat with him, he never commented on my
photos or any shared thing. He never puts a like [sic].”
“I never like or comment on his post, I never chat with
him. [..] Actually I do not notice if he likes my posts. But I
do not do [sic] any interaction.”
For question Q2, participants agreed that they have never
met in real life friends for whom they answered “Never”.
Reasons for accepting the friend invitations from such
friends include “he is a friend of my friend and my friend met
him in real life”, and “she is from my same [sic] college”.
This suggests that friends with whom the user has never in-
teracted in Facebook and in real life, may be strangers. Such
strangers may exploit Facebook affordances (e.g., claim col-
lege education) to befriend victims.
The next two questions identify perceived timeline
abusers, i.e., (Q3) This friend would abuse or misuse a sen-
sitive picture that you upload and (Q4) This friend would
abuse a status updated that you upload. The possible re-
sponses are “Agree”, “Disagree” and “Don’t Know”. After
answering “Agree” for Q3, participants shared several sto-
ries of abuse, e.g.,
“Once this friend has downloaded my photo and then
opened a fake Facebook account, like with that picture.”, and
“This friend has posted a bad comment in one of my pho-
tos. That was my wedding photo. I felt so offended.”
Participants who answered “Agree” for a friend on Q4
shared other stories of abuse, e.g.:
“This friend posted a bad comment on my post and from
that post there was other bad stuff posted on my wall.”, and
“Once I posted a sad status update because I was feeling
frustrated. But this friend then posted a trolling comment on
my post.”
The last question (Q5) This friend would post offensive,
misleading, false or potentially malicious content on Face-
book identifies perceived news-feed abusers. Stories shared
by participants who answered “Agree” on Q5 include:
“This friend bothered friends by bad posts [..] The posts
were against my own ideas [sic].”, and
“I have often seen this friend sharing fake news. Some-
times she posts so much bogus stuff that my news feed gets
flooded.”
These examples show that privacy and security abuses oc-
cur in the real life interactions of Facebook users and their
friends. The following AbuSniff modules seek to predict the
user perception of abuse and convert it into defensive actions
that users will consider appropriate.
The Abuse Prediction and Data Collection Modules
We investigate the ability of a supervised learning approach
to provide an affirmative answer to question RQ4 (can AbuS-
niff predict the abusive friends and the defenses that users
are willing to take against such friends?).
We introduce 7 mutual activity features, based on the
Facebook data shared by a user U and a friend F : (1) mu-
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Action
1 Never Never !Agree !Agree !Agree Unfriend/
Sandbox
2 Never Never ∗ ∗ ∗ Unfriend
3 Never !Never Agree Agree Agree Unfriend
4 !Never Never Agree Agree Agree Unfriend
5 Never !Never Agree !Agree Agree Unfriend
6 Never !Never !Agree Agree Agree Unfriend
7 !Never Never Agree !Agree Agree Unfriend
8 !Never Never !Agree Agree Agree Unfriend
9 !Never !Never Agree Agree Agree Unfriend
10 !Never !Never Agree !Agree Agree Unfriend
11 !Never !Never !Agree Agree Agree Unfriend
12 !Never !Never Agree Agree !Agree Restrict
13 !Never !Never Agree !Agree !Agree Restrict
14 !Never !Never !Agree Agree !Agree Restrict
15 !Never !Never !Agree !Agree Agree Unfollow
16 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ NOP
Table 1: Set of rules to convert questionnaire responses to
defensive actions. Like firewall filters, the first matching rule
applies. !A denotes any response different from A. NOP =
no operation.
tual post count: the number of stories posted by either U or
F , on which the other has posted a comment, (2) common
photo count: the number of photos in which both U and F
are tagged together, (3) mutual friend count: the number of
common friends of U and F , (4,5) same current city and
hometown: boolean values that are true when U and F live
in the same city and are from the same place, (6,7) common
study and work count: the total number of places where U
and F have studied and are employed together, respectively.
The abuse prediction module (APM) uses supervised
learning algorithms trained on these features, and previously
collected questionnaire responses and user decisions, to pre-
dict the user’s answers to the QRM questionnaire and the
user’s reactions to suggested actions. We report accuracy re-
sults in the evaluation section.
The Data Collection Module (DCM) collects Facebook
data from the user and her evaluation friends, as well as user
provided input (e.g., responses from the QRM, choices from
the IM) and timing information. AbuSniff uses this data to
make local decisions and partially reports it to our server for
evaluation purposes.
The Abuse Inference Engine (AIE)
(Vitak and Kim 2014) found that to mitigate risks, prudent
social network users (i.e., graduate students) used a variety
of risk management techniques that include limiting the re-
cipients of posts, hiding friends from their news feed, and
unfriending friends. AbuSniff seeks to provide similarly safe
social interactions to regular social network users. To this
end, the abuse inference engine (AIE) takes as input the re-
sponses collected by the QRM or predicted by the APM, and
outputs suggested actions from the set { “unfriend”, “unfol-
low”, “restrict access”, “sandbox”, “ignore”}.
AIE uses the rules shown in Table 1, applied on a first
match basis: rule r is evaluated only if all the rules 1 to r
- 1 have failed. The first 15 rules detect restrictive actions;
if none matches, the last rule decides that the friend is not
abusive (i.e., ignore). Initially, we took a hard stance against
abuse: a friend who scores negatively on any 2 out of the 5
questions (i.e., assigned “Never” in any of the 2 first ques-
tions, “Agree” in any of the last 3 questions) should be un-
friended (rules 1-11). However, AIE outputs less restrictive
actions against friends with whom the user has interacted
both in Facebook and in real life, and is either only a time-
line abuser (restrict, rules 12-14) or only a news-feed abuser
(unfollow, rule 15). We evaluate and adjust these rules in the
evaluation section.
The Intervention Module (IM)
To help us answer the key research questions RQ2 and RQ3,
we have designed a user interface that asks the user to take
a defensive action against each friend detected as abusive by
the AIE module. The action, i.e., unfriend, restrict, unfollow,
is determined according to the rule matched in Table 1.
Figure 2(b) shows a snapshot of the “unfriend” recom-
mendation. The UI further educates the user on the meaning
of the action, and lists the reasons for the suggestion, based
on the questionnaire responses that have matched the rule,
see Figure 2(a).
The user is offered the option to accept or ignore the sug-
gestion. If the user chooses to ignore the suggestion, the IM
module asks the user (through a PopupWindow) to provide
a reason, see Figure 2(c). We have conducted a focus group
with 20 participants in order to identify possible reasons for
ignoring “unfriend” recommendations. They include “the
suggestion does not make sense”, “I agree, but I want to un-
friend later”, “I agree but I am still unwilling to unfriend”,
and “I don’t want this friend to find out that I unfriended”,
see Figure 2(c). We did not include an open text box, as we
did not expect that participants will type an answer on a mo-
bile device.
The IM module educates users about the meaning and
dangers of having a stranger as a friend, see Figure 2(d).
It also offers the option to “sandbox” such friends. Accord-
ing to the rules of Table 1, IM also suggests unfollowing or
restricting friends who are abusive in only one direction of
their communications. Figure 2(e) shows a snapshot of the
restrict screen, its meaning and reasons for selection.
User Study
We have conducted several user studies to answer our key
research questions. In the following we describe the par-
ticipant recruitment procedure, the experiment design, and
techniques we used to ensure data quality.
We have recruited 325 participants from JobBoy (Job
2017), during 7 studies conducted between August 2016 and
October 2017. The jobs we posted asked the participants to
install AbuSniff from the Google Play store, use it to login to
their Facebook accounts and follow the instructions on the
screen. A participant who successfully completes the app,
receives on the last screen a code required for payment. We
have paid each participant $3, with a median job completion
time of 928s (SD = 420s).
Figure 2: Anonymized screenshots of the Android AbuSniff app: (a) QRM questionnaire. The first two questions identify
stranger friends, questions 3 and 4 identify perceived timeline abuse and question 5 identifies perceived news feed abuse. (b)
The IM UI asking the user to unfriend an abusive friend also explains the reasons for the action, according to the questionnaire
responses. (c) The IM UI asking the user to explain the reasons for the unwillingness to unfriend in the previous screen. (d) The
“unfriend or sandbox” UI for privacy abuse: sandboxing isolates but does not unfriend or notify the friend. (e) The UI of the
autonomous AbuSniff asking user confirmation to restrict the access of a friend predicted to be a timeline abuser.
We have only recruited participants who have at least 30
Facebook friends, had access to an Android device, and were
at least 18 years old. Further, we have used the following
mechanisms to ensure the quality of the data collected.
• Attention-check screen. To ensure that the participants
pay attention and are able to understand and follow sim-
ple instructions in English, AbuSniff includes a standard
attention-check screen at the beginning of the app.
• Bogus friends. To detect participants who answer ques-
tions at random, we used “bogus friends”: 3 fake identities
(2 female, 1 male) that we included at random positions in
the AbuSniff questionnaire. We have discarded the data from
participants who answered Q1 and Q2 for the bogus friends,
in any other way than “Never” or “Don’t Remember”.
• Timing information. We have measured the time taken
by participants to answer each questionnaire question and
to make a decision on whether to accept or ignore the sug-
gested action. We have discarded data from participants
whose average response time was below 3s.
We have used these mechanisms to discard 62 of the re-
cruited 325 participants. The following results are shown
over the remaining 263 participants. Figure 3 shows the
distribution of the country of origin (left) and age (right),
by gender, over these participants. The 151 male and 112
female participants are from 25 countries (top 5: US,
Bangladesh, India, Nepal and UK) and 6 continents, and are
between 18-52 years old (M = 23, SD = 7.22).
Ethical Data Collection
We have developed our protocols to interact with partici-
pants and collect data in an ethical, IRB-approved manner
(Approval #: IRB-16-0329-CR01). The 54 participants from
whose friends we collected mutual activity features, were
made aware and approved of this data collection step. We
have collected minimalistic Facebook data about only their
investigated friend relationships. Specifically, we have only
collected the counts of common friends, posted items, stud-
ies and workplaces, and boolean values for the same current
city and hometown, but not the values of these fields. Fur-
ther, we have only collected anonymized data, and the auto-
mated AbuSniff version never sends this data from the user’s
mobile device. AbuSniff only uses the data to make two pre-
dictions (the type of abuse and whether the user will take the
suggested action, then erases the collected Facebook data.
Results
Abuse Perception and Willingness to Defend
We developed 2 preliminary studies (n = 20 and n = 60) to
evaluate the extent of the user perception of stranger friends
and friend abuse in Facebook (RQ1) and the willingness of
users to accept defensive actions against friends considered
to be abusive (RQ2 and RQ3). To this end, AbuSniff used
the QRM, DCM, AIE and IM modules, see Figure 1. Fur-
ther, AbuSniff randomly selected 20 Facebook friends of
each participant, asked the participant to answer the ques-
tionnaire for each friend, then asked the participant to take
a defensive action against the friends detected to be abusive,
or provide a reason for ignoring the suggested action.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the responses for each
of the 5 questions from the 1,600 friend relationships (20
from each participant). Further, 64 of the 80 participants
stated that they have at least one friend with whom they
have never interacted in Facebook, while 73 of the partic-
ipants had at least one friend with whom they have never
interacted in real life. 68 of the participants had at least 1
Figure 3: Participant demographics. (country) Distribution
of the 25 countries of residence by gender. (age) Distribution
of age range by gender.
Figure 4: Distribution of responses for the friend abuse ques-
tionnaire over 1,600 Facebook friend relationships. The red
sections correspond to potential strangers or abusive friends.
friend whom they perceived would abuse their photos, 62 of
the participants have at least 1 friend who would abuse their
status updates, and 62 have at least 1 friend who would post
abusive content.
Gender and age impact. In terms of having at least 1 friend
perceived as abusive, Chi-square tests revealed no significant
difference between genders on any of the 5 questions. Simi-
larly, Chi-square tests revealed no significant differences be-
tween the age groups of under 30 years old and above 30
years old participants (61 vs 19 participants), on questions
1, 2 and 4. However, participants under 30 are significantly
more likely (χ2 = 4.417, df = 1, p = 0.03) to have at least 1
friend whom they perceive would abuse a photo they post,
than participants over 30 (52 out of 61 vs 12 out of 19).
Younger participants were also more likely to answer that
they have at least 1 friend who would post offensive, mis-
leading, false or potentially malicious content (50 out of 61
vs 10 out of 19, χ2 = 6.64, df = 1, p = 0.01).
Willingness to Defend Against Abuse. In the first of the
above 2 studies (n = 20, 400 investigated friend relation-
Figure 5: Recommendation vs. acceptance in study 1 (n =
20) and study 2 (n = 60). The “sandbox” option and user
education were effective: 92% of the suggested “unfriend
or sandbox” suggestions were approved by participants.
ships), AbuSniff identified 85 abusive friend relations. Of
these, AbuSniff recommended 74 to unfriend, 6 to restrict
and 5 to unfollow. The results are summarized in Figure 5(a).
4 out of the 6 recommended restrict friends were restricted,
and 4 out of the recommended 5 were unfollowed. However,
only 6 out of 74 recommended unfriend were unfriended. In
55 of the 68 (74 - 6) unfriended friends, the participants be-
lieved that our warning was correct. However, they refused
to unfriend because either they were not ready to unfriend
them at that time (18 of the 55 cases), they still wanted to
keep those abusive friends (11 cases), or they were afraid
that this action will be observable by the abuser (26 cases).
The “Sandbox” Effect. To address the fear of being ob-
served by the unfriended friend, we have relaxed rule 1 in
Table 1, to give the user the option to either sandbox or un-
friend a non-abusive stranger. A sandboxed friend can no
longer harm the user, as all Facebook communication lines
are interrupted. Sandboxing achieves this without severing
the friend link, thus is not observable by the friend. Further,
we have modified AbuSniff’s UI to educate the user through
a description of the harm that strangers can perform, and of
the defenses that the user can take against such friends. Fig-
ure 2(d)) shows a snapshot of the modified UI screen that
offers the sandbox alternative to unfriending strangers.
The second user study described above (n = 60) evaluated
the updated AbuSniff, that identified a total of 513 abusive
friend relations. Figure 5(study 2) shows that AbuSniff rec-
ommended 303 to unfriend, 53 to unfriend or sandbox, 138
to restrict and 19 to unfollow. Consistent with the first study,
18 of the 19 unfollow and 127 of the 138 restrict suggestions
were accepted. In contrast to the first study, 49 of the 53
“unfriend or sandbox” suggestions were accepted. In addi-
tion, 208 of 303 “pure” unfriend recommendations were ac-
cepted, again a significant improvement over the first study
(6 out of 74). Only 5 out of the 95 ignored unfriend rec-
ommendations were due to the participant not believing our
recommendation.
Efficacy of Abuse Prediction
To answer key question RQ4, in a fourth study we used
AbuSniff to collect a subset of Facebook data from 1,452
Question Precision Recall F-Measure Class
0.983 1.000 0.992 Frequently
0.928 0.897 0.912 Occasionally
Q1 0.962 0.797 0.872 Not Anymore
(RF) 0.818 0.920 0.866 Never
0.934 0.898 0.916 Don’t Remember
0.917 0.914 0.914 Weighted Avg.
0.966 0.905 0.934 Frequently
0.893 0.869 0.881 Occasionally
Q2 0.893 0.877 0.885 Not Anymore
(RF) 0.865 0.932 0.897 Never
0.907 0.911 0.909 Don’t Remember
0.902 0.900 0.900 Weighted Avg.
0.725 0.792 0.757 Agree
Q3 0.820 0.793 0.806 Disagree
(DT) 0.810 0.791 0.800 Don’t Know
0.794 0.792 0.793 Avg.
0.662 0.725 0.692 Agree
Q4 0.791 0.778 0.785 Disagree
(DT) 0.857 0.844 0.851 Don’t Know
0.805 0.803 0.804 Avg.
0.794 0.765 0.780 Agree
Q5 0.837 0.845 0.841 Disagree
(RF) 0.830 0.842 0.836 Don’t Know
0.824 0.824 0.824 Avg.
Table 2: Precision, recall and F-measure of APM for ques-
tions Q1 (RF), Q2 (RF), Q3 (DT), Q4 (DT) and Q5 (RF).
friend relationships of 54 participants. We have computed
the 7 mutual activity features of the 54 participants and the
1,452 friends, and used 10-fold cross validation to evaluate
the ability of the abuse prediction module (APM) to predict
questionnaire responses and user defense decisions.
As shown in Figure 4, the distribution of the answers
to the 5 questions of the questionnaire was not balanced.
To address this imbalance, we have duplicated tuples from
the minority classes up to the the number of the majority
class. We have ensured that duplicates appear in the same
fold, to prevent testing on trained tuples. We have used
Weka 3.8.1 (Wek 2017) to test several supervised learn-
ing algorithms, including Random Forest (RF), Decision
Trees (DT), SVM, PART, MultiClassClassifier, SimpleLo-
gistic, K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) and Naive Bayes, but
report only the best performing algorithm.
Predicting questionnaire answers. Table 2 shows the pre-
cision, recall and F-measure achieved by the best performing
supervised learning algorithm for each of the questionnaire
questions (Q1-Q5). The RF classifier achieved the best F-
measure for questions Q1, Q2 and Q5, while the DT classi-
fier achieved the best F-measure for Q3 and Q4. We observe
a higher F-measure in predicting answers to the questions
that suggest stranger friends (Q1 and Q2) than in predicting
answers to the questions that suggest abuse (Q3-Q5). This is
not surprising, as the mutual activity features are more likely
to predict online and real life closeness.
Predicting the user decision. We have evaluated the abil-
ity of APM to predict the defense action that the user
agrees to implement, according to the 5 possible classes:
“unfriend”, “restrict”, “unfollow”, “sandbox”, and “ignore”.
APM achieved the best performance with the RF classi-
fier. Table 3 shows the confusion matrix for APM with RF,
Classified As
Unfriend Sandbox Restrict Unfollow Ignore Decision
882 13 10 13 3 Unfriend
103 27 1 1 3 Sandbox
77 1 6 0 1 Restrict
79 3 0 6 0 Unfollow
5 0 0 0 218 Ignore
Table 3: APM confusion matrix for predicting user deci-
sions. The rows show participant decisions, the columns
show APM predictions during the experiment. AbuSniff
will leverage APM’s high precision (96.9%) and recall
(97.8%) for the “ignore” action, to decide which abusive
friends to ignore.
over the 10-fold cross validation performed on the 1,452
friend instances. While the overall F-Measure is 73.2%,
APM achieved an F-measure of 97.3% when predicting the
“ignore” option.
Feature rank. The most informative features in terms of
information gain were consistently among the mutual post
count, mutual friend count and mutual photo count; same
hometown and common study count were the least infor-
mative features. We found correlations between the com-
mon photo count and mutual post count (Pearson correlation
coefficient of 0.65), mutual friend count and mutual photo
count (Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.57), and mutual
post count and mutual friend count (Pearson correlation co-
efficient of 0.45). The rest of the features had insignificant
positive or negative correlations.
AbuSniff in the Wild
To evaluate the autonomous AbuSniff live, on real users,
we have replaced the questionnaire delivery module (QRM)
with the abuse prediction module (APM). AbuSniff then
asks the user to either accept or ignore the APM predicted
defense action, only for the friends for whom the APM pre-
dicts that the user will defend against.
We have recruited 49 participants to evaluate their reac-
tion to the predictions of the APM module. We have dis-
carded 9 participants who failed the data quality verification
tests previously described. Of the 1,200 friend relationships
investigated for the remaining 40 participants (30 friends per
participant), APM automatically labeled 403 as potentially
abusive. AbuSniff predicted that 359 of these will be ap-
proved by the participants, i.e., 41 unfollow, 30 restrict, 137
unfriend and 151 sandbox. All the unfollow and 29 of the 30
restrict suggestions were accepted by the participants. 119 of
the suggested sandbox relationships and 92 of the suggested
unfriend relationships were accepted. Thus, overall, the 40
participants accepted 78% of AbuSniff’s suggestions.
Impact of AbuSniff
In the last 2 user studies we have evaluated the impact of
AbuSniff on (1) the willingness of participants to ignore new
friend invitations based on their perception of the prospec-
tive friend being a stranger or an abuser, on (2) participant
awareness of and perception of safety from friend abuse, and
(3) their willingness to screen other friends.
(a)
(b)
Figure 6: (a) AbuSniff impact on (I1), (I2) and (I3). For each
question, top bar shows pre-test and bottom bar shows post-
test results. In the post-test, significantly more participants
tend to strongly agree or agree that they would reject new
friend invitations based on lack of interaction or perceived
timeline or news feed abuse, when compared to the pre-test.
(b) Post-test results for (I4), (I5) and (I6).
For this, we have designed a pre-study survey that consists
of 3 Likert items: (I1) “When I receive a friend invitation
in Facebook, I reject it if I have never interacted with that
person in real life or online”, (I2) “When I receive a friend
invitation in Facebook, I reject it if I think that the person
would abuse my photos or status updates in Facebook, and
(I3) “ When I receive a friend invitation in Facebook, I re-
ject it if I think that the person would post abusive material
(offensive, misleading, false or potentially malicious).” We
performed a pre-test only study with 31 participants, where
we have delivered (only) this survey.
Further, we have designed a post-study survey that con-
sists of the above 3 items, plus the following 3 Likert items:
(I4) “After completing AbuSniff, I feel more aware of the
implications of friend abuse in Facebook”, (I5) “After com-
pleting AbuSniff, I feel more protected from abuse from
Facebook friends”, and (I6) “I will go to my friend list and
evaluate my other friends to defend against those I feel could
be abusive”. In a post-test study with a different set of 31 par-
ticipants, we asked them to first run the questionnaire based
AbuSniff version, then answer the post-study survey.
Figure 6(a) compares the user responses in the pre-
test (top) and post-test (bottom) for each of the first 3
Likert items. In the pre-test, the user responses are bal-
anced between agree, neutral and disagree, and there are no
strong agree and strong disagree responses. In contrast, af-
ter running AbuSniff, significantly more participants either
strongly agree or agree on all 3 items.
Figure 6(b) shows the participant responses to only the 3
new post-test Likert items. 23 out of 31 participants strongly
agree or agree that after running AbuSniff they feel more
aware of the implications of friend abuse; only 1 disagreed.
19 participants strongly agree or agree that after running
AbuSniff they feel more protected from friend abuse; 4 par-
ticipants disagree. 20 participants strongly agree or agree
that they would revisit their other friends after running
AbuSniff, and only 3 disagree, 1 strongly disagrees.
Discussion and Limitations
AbuSniff differs from prior work on cyber abuse and vic-
timization, e.g., (Wolford-Cleveng et al. 2016; Landoll,
La Greca, and Lai 2013) in that we (1) focus on specific
types of abuse perpetrated through Facebook, i.e., timeline
and news-feed abuse, and stranger friends, (2) investigate
abuse perception from individual friends and not general ex-
posure, (3) seek to automatically detect abuse perception and
(4) provide a first line of suitable defenses against abuse for
Facebook users who are unlikely to know and trust all their
friends. We performed studies with 263 participants from
25 countries and 6 continents. We acknowledge a common
crowdsourcing worker background between participants.
AbuSniff reduces the attack surface of its users, by reduc-
ing the number of, or isolating friends predicted to be per-
ceived as potential attack vectors. AbuSniff can reduce the
audience that needs to be considered by audience selector
solutions, e.g., (Raber, Luca, and Graus 2016), and can be
used in conjunction with tools that monitor social network-
ing events (Dinakar et al. 2012; Per 2017).
We expect AbuSniff to have more impact for users who
have significantly more than 150 friends, the maximum
number of meaningful friend relationships that humans can
manage (Dunbar 1992). We note that false positives, while
being a nuisance, can be fixed by reinstating removed or re-
stricted friends. However, false negatives (keeping abusive
and stranger friends) can harm the user and even influence
the outcome of elections (BBC 2017a; BBC 2017b).
Online relationships and loose tie friends. Social networks
like Facebook encourage online relationships (people never
met in real life) and loose ties (users keeping up to date
with the posts of others, without bi-directional communi-
cation). AbuSniff defines and detects “strangers” as friends
with whom the user has no online and real world communi-
cations. Thus, since “keeping up to date” is considered in-
teraction, AbuSniff does not detect and suggest removing
strictly online relationships or loose tie friends.
Prediction accuracy. The APM features extracted from mu-
tual Facebook activities are less effective in predicting the
user responses to Q3-Q5. This is not surprising, as we have
trained APM on relationship closeness features. The choice
of features was needed to respect Facebook’s terms of ser-
vice. Access to more information, e.g., stories on which
friends posted replies and the friend replies, and abuse de-
tection APIs (Per 2017) can improve APM’s prediction per-
formance. We observe that AbuSniff had an F-Measure of
97.3% when predicting the “ignore” action.
Keeping friends perceived to be abusive. In the first study,
for 11 of the 68 unfriended friend cases, the participants be-
lieved that our warning was correct, but still wanted to keep
those friends. One reason may be that the participant had
reasons to make him or her abusive toward that friend. We
leave this investigation for future work, but note that AbuS-
niff may protect the friends if they installed AbuSniff.
Friend evaluation limitations. We chose to evaluate 20 to
30 friends per participant. A larger number may increase
participant fatigue or boredom when answering the ques-
tionnaire, thus reduce the quality of the data. More studies
are needed to find the optimal number of evaluated friends
per participant, and whether it should be a function of the
participant background, e.g., friend count, age, gender.
Related Work
The features provided by online services are known to in-
fluence abuse and generate negative socio-psychological ef-
fects (Singh et al. 2017). Social networks in particular enable
a diverse set of abusive behaviors, that include the adversar-
ial collection and abuse of private information (BBC 2017a;
Yates 2017; Yang and Srinivasan 2014; Nosko, Wood, and
Molema 2010; Gao et al. 2010), cyberbullying (Wolford-
Cleveng et al. 2016; Landoll, La Greca, and Lai 2013; El-
phinston and Noller 2011; Quercia, Bodaghi, and Crowcroft
2012), and the viral distribution of fake news, misinforma-
tion, propaganda and malware (BBC 2017a; Lee 2017; Sin-
delar 2014; Aro 2016; Weimann 2010; Al-Shishani 2010).
(Cao et al. 2015) detect the fake accounts behind friend
spam, by extending the Kernighan-Lin heuristic to partition
the social graph into two regions, that minimize the aggre-
gate acceptance rate of friend requests from one region to
the other. (Wu et al. 2015) utilized posting relations between
users and messages to combine social spammer and spam
message detection. (Quercia and Hailes 2010) maintain in-
formation about friendly and suspicious devices that the user
encounters in time, to decide if the user is the target of a
friend spam attack. AbuSniff focuses on the user perception
of strangers friends, their automatic detection and defenses.
(Wolford-Cleveng et al. 2016) have used the Partner Cy-
ber Abuse Questionnaire and found a prevalence of 40%
of victimization by cyber abuse among college students in
dating relationships, with no differences in victimization of
men and women. (Landoll, La Greca, and Lai 2013) de-
veloped the Social Networking-Peer Experiences Question-
naire (SN-PEQ) and used it to study cyber victimization in
adolescents and young adults. They found that negative so-
cial networking experiences were associated with symptoms
of social anxiety and depression. (Elphinston and Noller
2011) developed an 8 item questionnaire to explore the im-
pact of involvement with Facebook on relationship satisfac-
tion and found that Facebook intrusion was linked to re-
lationship dissatisfaction via experiences of cognitive jeal-
ousy and surveillance behaviors. AbuSniff can help detect
and protect against such behaviors.
(Quercia, Bodaghi, and Crowcroft 2012) found that the
reasons for ending friend relations are similar in the real
and online worlds, and conjectured that tools can be built to
monitor online relations. To detect cyberbullying, (Dinakar
et al. 2012) used datasets of manually annotated comments,
NLP features, supervised learning, and reasoning technique,
then proposed several intervention designs. (Ashktorab and
Vitak 2016) developed and conducted participatory design
sessions with teenage participants to design, improve, and
evaluate prototypes that address cyberbullying scenarios.
(Narwal et al. 2017) introduced an automated Twitter as-
sistant that identifies text and visual bias, aggregates and
presents evidence of bias to users, and enable activists to
inform the public of bias, through bots.
(Kwak, Chun, and Moon 2011) found that in Twitter,
Korean users tended to unfollow people who posted many
tweets per time unit, about uninteresting topics, including
details of their lives. (Xu et al. 2013) found that unfollow
tends to be reciprocal. This relatively harmless tit-for-tat be-
havior may explain the willingness of participants in our
studies to unfollow abusive friends. (Kwak, Moon, and Lee
2012) found that users who receive acknowledgments from
others are less likely to unfollow them. Future work may
compare the willingness of a user to unfollow Facebook
friends who posted general abuse vs. abuse personally tar-
geted to the user.
Conclusions
We have introduced and studied AbuSniff, the first friend
abuse detection and defense system for Facebook. We have
developed a compact “stranger and abuse” detection ques-
tionnaire. We have introduced and studied rules to convert
questionnaire answers to defensive actions. We have shown
that supervised learning algorithms can use social network-
ing based features to predict questionnaire answers and de-
fense choices. AbuSniff increased participant willingness to
reject invitations from perceived strangers and abusers, as
well as awareness of friend abuse implications and perceived
protection from friend abuse.
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